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(ICCV 2017) Adversarial Examples for Semantic Segmentation and Object Detection

Xie C, Wang J, Zhang Z, et al. Adversarial examples for semantic segmentation and object detection[C]//Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision. 2017: 1369-1378.



1. Overview


In this paper, it proposed Dense Adversary Generation (DAG)

  • optimize a loss function over a set of pixels/proposals for generating adversarial perturbations
  • consider all targets simultaneously and optimizes the overall loss function
  • 150~200 iteration
  • change IOU to preserve more proposals. generating adversarial example is more difficult in detection then segmentation (O(N*N) vs O(N), N pixels)
  • add two or more heterogeneous perturbations significantly increase the transferability
  • FGSM
  • universal adversarial perturbation
  • trained a network to generate adversarial examples for a target model
  • ensemble-based approaches to generate adversarial examples with stronger transferability
  • forveation-based mechanism to alleviate adversarial examples
  • defensive distillation
  • train network on adversarial examples
  • ensemble adversarial training methods



2. Methods




  • t_n. n-th target in the image
  • X. image
  • f_{l}. the score of l class
  • l_n. the class of target t_n
  • l_nā€™. the any class except the gt class l_n


  • T. activate target set (predict right)


  • normalize r


  • Ī³ = 0.5


  • r. sum of all r_m
  • X^. the mean image of X. often X-X^



3. Details


  • target set selection is more difficult in detection task.
    when the adversarial perturbation r is added t the original image X, a different set of proposals may be generated according to the net input X+r.
  • incrase the threshhold of NMS in RPN(IOU: 0.7 to 0.9 ā†’ 300 proposals to 3000 proposals)



4. Experiments


4.1. Comparison



  • permuted perturbations cause negligible accuracy drop
  • indicate that it is the spatial structure of r, instead of its magnitude, contributes in generating adversarial examples

4.2. Control Output



4.3. Denseness of Proposals



4.4. Convergence



4.5. Perceptibility



  • K. number of pixels
  • segmentation. 2.6e-3, 2.5e-3, 2.9e-3, 3e-3 on FCN-Alex, FCN-Alex, FCN-VGG, FCN-VGG
  • detection. 2.4e-3, 2.7e-3, 1.5e-3, 1.7e-3

4.6. Transferability



4.6.1. Cross-Training Transfer

  • perturbation learn from one network to another network with same architecture but different dataset

4.6.2. Cross-Network Transfer

  • through different network structures

4.6.3. Cross-Task Transfer

  • perturbation generated from one task to attack another task
  • drop significantly between same network (FCN-VGG, FR-VGG-07)

4.6.4. Combining Heterogeneous Perturbations



  • add multiple adversarial perturbation often works better than adding a single source of perturbation